Introduction
In this paper I would like to argue that we are better sociolinguists if we care about what linguistically unspoiled people think about language -in other words: if we know more about people's mental models of language. Secondly, I would like to think about if and how those mental models constrain linguistic behavior. I will argue that, indeed, there is a connection between mental models and linguistic choices, but that this connection follows general principles of highlevel cognition. Since cognitive semantics is the linguistic subdiscipline which tries to find out how human conceptual systems are organized and how they are related to linguistic units, it is helpful to use ideas from cognitive semantics in order to understand the scope, effects and internal mechanisms of our mental models of language. The third problem I want to address in my paper is a methodological one: what methodological choices should sociolinguists make in order to find out more about the cognitive and social foundations of language and language change.
One of the major issues in attitude research has been the question of how attitudes are related to linguistic practice. Attitudes have been a cornerstone in social psychological research for many years now, but nevertheless there is considerable disagreement on what they are and if and how they affect human action (cf. Edwards 1994: 97; Kolde 1981: 336) . I will try to use what we know from sociolinguistic and cognitive linguistic theory about how the (social) mind works in order to shed some new light on attitudes and linguistic practice.
The general issue this paper is related to is the apparent inconsistency of people s beliefs concerning languages, dialects or sociolects and how people linguistically behave in social interaction. This is an old type of question in social psychology: very early, attitude research has come up with the insight that people might expose one kind of attitude in an interview and behave differently in 'real life'. The most famous example might be the one by LaPierre in the 1930s. At a time which was characterized by overt discrimination of Blacks and Asians (not only in America), LaPierre traveled all over the US with a Chinese couple. They were being served in almost every hotel and restaurant they visited. After that, LaPierre gathered responses from the hotel and restaurant staff, asking them to state if they would admit Chinese in their establishments or not. Most of them said "no". This lead the early attitude researchers to believe that very often there is no direct link between attitudes and behavior. Another more recent study in Montréal (Bourhis 1984) has asked francophones if they reply in English when a stranger addresses them in English. They insisted much less on their native language in actual linguistic practice than in their self-evaluations.
Sometimes, this type of evidence is used as a fundamental argument against attitude studies, claiming that the results of attitude data collections do not give valid pictures of the 'real' attitudes (cf. the discussion of this issue in Vandermeeren 1996: 696) . In this paper, I do not advocate this type of critique. On the contrary, I propose to accept this discrepancy as an interesting fact and I will show that it can be seen as an entailment of some basic aspects of human cognition. On the basis of those cognitive mechanisms and constraints, I will try to give a new account of the interrelated attitudes, mental models and sociolinguistic practice.
Sociolinguistic accounts of attitude and behavior
Attitudes are generally deemed to be dispositions to react favorably or unfavorably to a class of objects (Edwards 1994: 97) . In a very general way, almost all sociolinguistic models of language change are implicitly assuming attitude-related causalities: for instance, speakers are likely to converge towards positively evaluated varieties. Traditionally, sociolinguistic argumentation is prestige-based (J. Milroy 1992: 149) . Although some sociolinguists have been very critical about the naive use of prestige for the explanation of language change, it is still extremely common to use this concept in a rather unquestioned way in contemporary sociolinguistics. The underlying idea is that either particular social groups or some members of a social group bear more prestige than others, and that the linguistic differences between high-prestige and low-prestige people are the main motor behind linguistic change from below. The Labovian tradition postulates a 'linguistic innovator' who bears a lot of prestige due to his or her socio-economic status in the local communities. At the same time, Labov claims that this innovator has to have important ties outside the immediate social environment:
Thus we have a portrait of individuals with the highest local prestige who are responsive to a somewhat broader form of prestige at the next larger level of social communication (Labov 1980: 261) .
The early account of such a correlation between the attitudinal domain and language change can be found in Labovian-style correlational sociolinguistics. Although it might not be necessary, I will give a -admittedly very simplified -account of the core arguments of this type of studies. Firstly, there is a continuum of prestige which is correlated with the social strata within a particular area. Secondly, there is generally some kind of a standard accent. The lower the social class, the further away it is from this standard: Fig. 1 : Sociolinguistic studies in the Labovian paradigm show how higher social classes and more formal styles tend to be closer to an assumed standard (most commonly represented by the abscissa). This figure depicts the values of the seminal study by Labov on the stratification of the (r) variable in New York City (Labov 1966 Trudgill's Norwich data (1974) show that there are not only social pressures to converge towards upper-class or standard varieties, but that non-standard forms can carry some sort of in-group prestige which leads to the well-observable fact that a lot of people continue using stigmatized underclass-variants. I will come back to the notion of covert prestige in section 4.3 of this paper.
Three Mental Models of Language
It is important to distinguish between the concept of language attitude as a predisposition to react in a certain way to a linguistic stimulus, on the one hand, and more conscious language-related mental representations, on the other hand. I propose to call this latter category non-linguist's 'mental models of language'. My claim is that the study of such mental models of language might shed at least some light on how attitudes arise and how we can understand the relationship between attitudes and social action. The only major research project on laypeople's ideas about language I am aware of is the one carried out by Preston and Niedzielski (1999) The ubiquitous metaphor KNOWING Is SEEING for instance tells us something about how our mind transfers embodied experienceseeing -to abstract domains such as thinking (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 48 (Lakoff 1994: 79f.) .
Metaphors and metonymies play an important role in the last analytical tool to be introduced here: Idealized cognitive models (ICMs). ICMs are built up representations of a domain, and they are grounded in experience and in innate aspects of mental processing. Besides metaphorical and metonymical mappings, ICMs make use of frames and scripts, and image-schematic structure (Lakoff 1994: 68 Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 57f.) . The meta-phorical construal of language and particularly grammar as a house or other large erect building is quite common. It has a great tradition at least in Western thought, as Mittelberg (1999) shows clearly. One of the most beautiful examples is the "tower of grammar" as shown in figure: <"•? WifiT' -QltrttJrftScc ritrtjlicljcilt ffitcmMbtcjitgcliDctrerctlEitn. Even grammarians shared and were using the metaphor LANGUAGE Is A BUILDING, as the following quote by Carl Philipp 3 But the grammar book has a higher goal: it shall explain us the secret joints through which the building of our language holds together ('closes itself in').
As in many other cases, an abstract entity is understood in terms of a concrete object rooted in physical space. We sort of speak a bit slang, sort of innit -like we would say 'innit' and all that. He was scared we might laugh at this perfect sort of English ... the good solid English that they teach 'em (Rampton 1995: 49; emphasis RB) In this quote from Rampton's data, an Indian adolescent is talking about his newly immigrated cousin who had benefited from upperclass education back in India, and whose idiolect is much more upper-class than the one of the local Indian adolescents in the area.
What we find here is thus the idea that 'good' standard language is a solid construction, as opposed to the unstable non-standard. I came across this kind of idea when doing fieldwork in Southern Germany: many of my informants (mostly farmers) were flabbergasted that the fieldworker insisted on the fact that their home-variety was worth studying and even was supposed to have a consistent grammar. However, we can also find similar data in the very different setting of the Mayan language Jacaltec (spoken mostly in southern Guatemala; cf. Grinevald Craig 1979: 52):
So the Jacaltec speakers also were very curious and puzzled about the intrusion of a foreign linguist who presumed to tell them that their language indeed has a grammar, as do all languages, and that it was well worth studying. Some were apologetic, saying their language had broken down, accusing themselves of not learning it and respecting it as had their parents and ancestors.
The Jacaltec speakers thought that only Spanish had a grammar. There are observations of both the insider view and the outsider view about dialects having no grammar. Finally, Niedzielski & Preston (1999: 22) (Grady 1997: 283) . This, for the case of languages, means, that a language has to be clearly in one or the other container and cannot be in both. A real, good language has to be pure, mixing is bad. Again, there are prototype effects at work (Lakoff 1994: 68) . One prototype of the category language is the ideal language: a 'pure' idiom which shows an ideal state of systematicity, is not affected by decay due to bad usage, shows no mixing etc. The widespread belief that language is in constant decay due to mixing, careless use, and other external influences resides on this Raw MATERIAL metaphor. The epistemic entailments of this mapping are that language used to be "pure" and "good" in earlier times and maybe still is pure (in the case of dialects) in remote, isolated communities (cf. Berthele 2001a (Woolard 1998: 17) , or language acquisition studies, where bilingual children as young as 2 show selfcorrecting when they are mixing languages (Foster 1990: 195 [...] Most directly relevant is the idea that members of the same culture live in spatial proximity to one another, and that the space they occupy is contiguous. The space they occupy is then their territory, i.e., their physical space is conceived of as belonging to them. No more than one culture can occupy a given space in the model (Rubba 1996: 241) .
This model thus involves metonymic relationships between language, culture, territory, and social network. This ICM of Territoriality is closely related to the romantic or Herderian conception which equates language, ethnicity and nation (cf. Coulmas 1988 , Dorian 1998 (Hayakawa 1994: 15) .
Again this seems to be a prototype effect based on the idea of an 'ideal nation': One ethnic community living in one coherent territory, with one common language. The additional metaphorical mapping here is that society is seen as a bunch of objects which have to be held together by something. This something is the common language. The ideal nation, just like the ideal husband, does not exist in reality, but its cognitively central status has important consequences for normative judgements about actually existing nations out there in the world.
So why not imagine English as a national means of communication? Again, the principle of territoriality seems to inhibit this solution: since English is an external language without a seat on the national territory, many Swiss find it odd to use it in the national context. The parameter of granularity applies relative to a particular level of scope. Granularity is the coarseness or fineness of the grid with which one attends to the contents within the chosen scope. That is, it is the general relative magnitude of the subdivisions that result from the further partitioning of the chosen scope of material (Talmy 2000: 456 Thirdly, some people fear that if we start using dialects in scientific and administrative contexts, those varieties are bound to lose their authenticity and start converging to some kind of an 'unpure' pseudo-koiné. Again, we encounter thus the LANGUAGE IS A Natu ral Res our ce model.
The second position can be accompanied by the first position, but it is not a priori necessary: it is possible to be aware of a dialect as at least as complex a building as the standard and nevertheless wanting to separate the two worlds. Maybe just for the sake of the possible negative audience reactions to non-standardness in scientific texts. The third position finally is the one of the dialect-protectors who are arguing at a relatively high level of granularity. They are applying the LANGUAGE Is A NATURAL RESOURCE metaphor on the level of dialects -and maybe on the level of the standard, too.
A Case Study: Granularity and Prestige in the Class Network
In this section, I propose to analyze some sociolinguistic data in terms of different levels of granularity. The data stem from the same study as the interview quoted in section 4.1. The sociolinguistic setting is a protestant private school in the traditionally catholic bilingual town of Fribourg (Berthele 2000a (Berthele , b, 2002 . To be very brief about the sociolinguistic setting, we can say that the strong language on the local level of granularity is French, the strongest minority language a local dialect (Sense or Freiburg German) traditionally used by the local German-speaking minority. The town has a strong catholic tradition, that is the reason for the existence of a protestant private school: the immigrated protestants didn't want to send their children to the public school dominated by the catholic heritage. On the level of granularity of this private school there is a particular dialect which is the prestige-variety, namely a dialect which resembles the neighboring Berne area dialect. There are cultural and sociological reasons for the choice of this prestige-variety: Berne is the place from which most of the protestant immigrants came during the 19th and 20th century. Although the Bernese are not a majority in this school anymore, the Bernese dialect still seems to be the school-internal prestige variety. In my research I analyzed the dialectal variation within a class of 14 schoolchildren. Figure depicts the sociographic structure of the class as well as the values for one particular dialectological variable. The social structure within the class has been elicited using a sociogram (Moreno 1954: 34) . This sociogram has been constructed based on the question "who do you like to play with". All mutual choices are represented by straight lines. The figure shows clearly how, on the one hand, most of the children share two or more lines and, on the other hand, five of them show only one or even none of those mutual sociographic choices.
Since the children in this private school do not come from traditional local families, they speak all kinds of non-local dialects and languages at home. Most of them are at least bilinguals or bidialectals, some are tri-and quadrilinguals. The linguistic variation within the class can be assessed in terms of how 'Bernese' a child speaks. Out of the 18 dialectological variables I have analyzed, figure only presents the one of the vocalization of /!/ (as in Bernese [bau] , most other Swiss varieties: [bal] ). This is one of the very salient features which distinguishes the Berne dialect from many other Swiss German dialects. The higher the values for this variable, the more Berne-dialect variants are found in the children's realizations of /l/.
The figure shows clearly that higher values for this variable correlate highly with the degree of integration into the class structure. On the whole, for all analyzed dialectological variables, there is a significant tendency to using Berne dialect variants with increasing social integration into the class network. But not only that, as I have shown elsewhere (Berthele 2002) , there is even a tendency to lose Bernese variants which were 'inherited' from the child's family background if the child does not identify herself with the mainstream part of the group. The data even suggest that the language-biography of a child is actually a very unreliable predictor for the child's actual linguistic practice in class, whereas the variables from the sociogram-domain turn out to be excellent predictors for the degree of 'Berneseness'. This is of course exactly what the sociolinguist would expect. But the point here lies not in the mere correlation of sociographic and dialectological variables. What fig. shows us is that the notion of a prestige dialect is relative to a particular level of granularity. On the level of the class as a whole, Bernese seems to be the prototypically chosen language by the majority. But if we zoom in to a higher level of granularity, for example the one of the friendship-dyad Yves and Martin, we can assume that Bernese here is no longer the prestige variety. This dyad, just like the one between Judith and Jessica, is much less oriented towards the class-language. In one of the interviews I have conducted with him, Martin tells me that for him the class is too small and that he does not find enough interesting friends within this group of children. Consequently, for Martin there are important additional ties outside the school-network. This latter point seems to be important for the very isolated Benjamin, too.
In Myers-Scotton (1980: 361) calls an exploratory choice. This is why Bourhis (1984) comes to those apparently contradicting results: the attitude is global, the actual linguistic negotiation is extremely local. The analyst can only understand the actual driving forces behind the linguistic choices actually taken if he or she zooms in on the highest level of granularity.
It should be clear by now how this idea can be applied to all kinds of other sociolinguistic results: Trudgill (1983: 177) found after a series of self-evaluation tests that the norm at which a large number of Norwich males are aiming is nonstandard WC speech. This favorable attitude is never overtly expressed (Trudgill 1983: 177 The forces favoring the standard are crystal clear: middle-class parents talk about "good" language, school teachers correct the usage of students, letters to the editor deplore slips away from prescribed usage (Chambers 1995: 221) .
Of course, in some contexts there might be good reasons to take this particular stance. But there is a certain danger that this point of view is maintained despite a lot of evidence for its insufficient explanatory power. The point is that covertness and overtness are phenomena which are constrained by the levels of granularity set up by three instances: firstly the general sociolingustic setting, secondly the immediate sociolinguistic interactants, and thirdly by the fieldworker.
Let us consider again a non-Anglo-Saxon setting in order to make the point very clear: In German-speaking Switzerland, it is not seldom to find overt normativity with regards to non-standard languages. When two dialectologists in our department were working on a dictionary of a Swiss German dialect, the local dialect protectors were furious that those 'people from the university' were including the variants of the younger generation as well: the young are not seen as prototypical speakers of the dialect, and the mere idea of including linguistic variation in a dictionary was considered absurd. You can find extremely overt normative statements about non-standard if you are eliciting them on the right level of granularity. Thus, if we return to Trudgill's Norwich study, can we really say that the Norwich men really never overtly express their attitude towards WC variants? -The fact that they do not do it with regards to the academic researcher only shows that they are aware of the normative level of granularity this type of person brings in.
In his sociolinguistics textbook, Chambers states that the pressures that maintain the non-standard "have no identifiable lobbyists" (Chambers 1995: 222) . Again, I think that this is not true for other contexts. We could certainly use Norway with its strong pro-dialect and pro-variation ideology as a counterexample (cf. Romaine 1997: 10), but for the present purposes I will stick to the situation I know best, the one in German-speaking Switzerland. Here, people certainly use dialects, but they also use their variant of the German standard language ("Schweizerhochdeutsch") . If the Swiss media anchors start using too much of a Germany-style accent in their Standard German, there are a lot of negative reactions particularly from academics, i.e. people of clearly upper-middle class (Löffler 1991: 44 (Rampton 1995: 57 
Conclusions
To sum sum up, there are three major points this paper tries to make. Firstly, traditional attitude-studies1 results are depending on the level of granularity activated in elicitation situation. Their value for the analysis of actual linguistic practice is thus to be relativized: if the elicitation situation does not match the real-life granularity, the results have only an indirect connection to the linguistic choices made in social interaction. Although the ideologies which are active on a lower level of granularity are present in the high-level situation of social interaction, they tend to be backgrounded in favor of more immediate evaluations of possible interactional losses and gains. The Gricean principle of co-operation and other maximes of communication often simply override the choices which would be expected on the basis of the low-level ideologies. Attitude studies often lack this congruence of granularity for data-collection on the one hand and 'action-measurement' on the other. The elicited attitudes were probably real, but not dominant in the setting of the actual social performance. E.g. in general, Americans in the 30s didn't want to serve Chinese people, but in face-to-face interaction they tended to see the particular Chinese in front of the hotel counter as almost normal people.
Secondly above. Undoubtedly, attitudes on very low levels of granularity do exist, but when it comes to actual behavior in real-life situations, many aspects of cognition are very local, and tend to change depending on the situational give and take. Therefore, if in a given country we encounter in general very positive attitudes towards local dialects, this does not mean that there is no convergence towards the standard or towards some other kind of a regional koiné: if, due to increased geographical mobility, more and more contacts take place with out-group-members (weak ties), those contacts, with their highlevel-granularity constraints I have outlined in this paper, can lead to linguistic accommodation phenomena which go against the expected dialect maintenance. In other words, despite the overtly expressed positive attitude with regards to local norms, the actual practice leads to phenomena like dialect leveling and koinéization. I believe that by using the principle of granularity outlined in this paper, we can better understand the observation that ideologies and attitudes on the one hand do not match actual practice on the other hand.
Thirdly, the often indirect relation between attitudinal factors and linguistic practice, have some important entailments for sociolinguistic research. Even the strongest ideological and attitudinal dispositions have to be relativized by considering the maximes of communication active at the highest level of granularity. In order to explain collective phenomena of language change, the researcher has to zoom in in order to see how small changes in linguistic practice -in their cumulation -affect a dialect or a language as a whole. The principle of granularity applies not only to the construal of language and social space of the speakers, but it is also a tool which allows the researcher to be aware of the level he/she is actually focussing on. Since the cognitive effort to jump across low and high levels of granularity is very low (cf. the example in section 4.1), we tend to forget that there is only an indirect connection between low-level ideologies and high-level linguistic interaction. Methodological individualism as proposed by Keller (1994) appears to be a good way to access the constraints on the most action-relevant highest levels of granularity.
